An Open Letter to Dr Abdallah Hamdok

By SUDAN TRIBUNE

In this brief piece, I address an open letter to my friend, Dr. Abdallah Hamdok, the former Prime Minister of Sudan’s transitional government and the chairperson of the Civil and Democratic Forces Coalition (Tagdum). This letter is prompted by our extensive discussions on Sudanese national affairs, with a particular focus on the critical matter of war and peace. Recognizing the significant relevance of our dialogue, I feel compelled to bring it into the public domain, aiming to contribute to the collective efforts of finding solutions to the prevailing crisis. The ultimate goal is to ensure that our people can experience lasting peace and rescue our nation from an uncertain and gloomy future.

Dear Hamdok

In recent weeks, we have engaged in an in-depth dialogue to explore effective strategies for ending the conflict in Sudan by establishing a single, professional national army with a unified command. This approach aligns with a unifying vision that fosters dialogue on the fundamental challenges facing the Sudanese state, transcending partisan divisions and disagreements regarding transitional governance structures. This is the only viable path to surmounting the obstacles that have repeatedly obstructed the construction of a stable Sudanese state and hampered democratic progress. This underscores the need to draw from the lessons of three failed transitional periods in our recent history (1964, 1985, 2019), as well as the transitional period following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which led to South Sudan’s independence but ultimately failed to establish two viable and prosperous nations. This inclusive approach entails the active participation of all political, societal, and civil forces in this foundational political process, excluding only the National Congress Party (NCP), the ruling party of the former totalitarian regime that was overthrown during the December Revolution. Additionally, any individuals involved in criminal or corrupt activities that contributed to the oppression of the Sudanese people are also excluded. This vision would pave the way for a transition from revolutionary legitimacy to constitutional electoral legitimacy, anchored in a consensus-based legitimacy during the foundational period.

We agreed that despite this challenge, it remains imperative that you, Hamdok, continue your efforts to bring together the parties and adversaries, and that the ball will remain in your court as long as you have the opportunity of leading the “Civil and Democratic Forces Coalition (Tagadum), and do not have any intentions to participate in any future political authority. Tagadum and the FFC’s Central Council need to realize that they do not in any way possess the legitimacy of representing the Sudanese people. You accepted the assignment to head the Coalition after a long dialogue with its components, and you even frankly told them that although “Tagadum” represents a good step forward, it does not reflect the true face of Sudan and that it requires patience and flexibility to reach out to others. Thus, you left before the end of Tagadum’s preparatory meeting of (Addis Ababa, 23-26 October 2823), and commenced a series of meetings with other forces outside the umbrella of “Tagadum”, e.g your meetings with Minni Arko Minawi, Abdul Wahid Nour, and with Jaafar Al-Mirghani, in order to achieve the greatest measure of political consensus. You mentioned to me that you had told these leaders, in your own words: “No one is asking you to come and join “Tagadum” or just occupy a back seat, so let us all work flexibly and through parallel channels so that we converge at the end, and this convergence will be achieved through a national body whose objective is to handle the foundational issues of the Sudanese state and let us postpone our differences, and agree to solve the country’s problems leaving partisan politics to the elections. All of this will only happen through a broad consensus. If you exclude any group, no matter how small, in the end, they will turn into spoilers”.

Also, in this context, you agreed with me to meet with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Abdelfatah Al-Burhan (with whom you were already in contact, through proxies), and the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), if feasible (since at the time of our discussion rumours had spread about his demise) to sit together and discuss a ceasefire. in order to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to agree on security arrangements leading to the formation of one army with a unified command, paving the way for the initiation of a foundational political process. This is especially so, since you, Hamdok, had a phone call with both leaders on the eve of the war, in which you asked them to solve their differences and take into account the country’s larger interest.

We both concluded that it is important to continue to exert all efforts towards the formation of a “national body or assembly focused on foundational issues and, as you put it, “to do what we can so that we do not lose this idea as it represents a historical opportunity. Although the war is devastating, it has created an opportunity to address problems which we failed to address for over 60 years. In order not to repeat this failure, we need to talk to all parties, form this “inclusive” national body for debating foundational issues, and remove the obstacles that may stand in its way.”

Addis Ababa Declaration

Dear Hamdok

Another opportunity to talk has not presented itself since 3^rd December 2023, until I was surprised by your signing of a political declaration, in your capacity as chairperson of “Tagadum”, with the Rapid Support Forces Commander in Addis Ababa on January 2nd, 2024. This declaration between two parties, one of which is military and the other political, confuses and contradicts the entirety of what you and I had agreed upon in seeking to bring together all Sudanese parties in a national assembly to decide on the foundational and constitutional issues. Rather, the meeting of “Tagadum” delegation with the RSF commander, the majority of whom are members of the FFC-Central Council, reflects a departure from and is not consistent with your efforts to expand the base of “Tagadum” by reaching out to others. Indeed, you had previously expressed to me your dissatisfaction with the meeting of the Executive Office of the FFC-Central Council in Cairo and their delegation’s visit to Juba, following the preparatory meeting of “Tagadum” in Addis Ababa, October 23-26, 2023, while they represented only a small part of “Tagadum”.

In my opinion, as long as your meeting with the RSF’s Commander happened first, it would have been more appropriate for you to present to him the idea of the national assembly which you endorsed and convince him that it represented a way out of the crisis, until such time that the meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army could be scheduled, and the joint meeting of both parties could take place. However, since objective circumstances dictated your meeting, accompanied by a delegation from “Tagadum”, with the RSF Commander first, it would have been more worth to addressing all of them about the necessity of reaching a common understanding that moves beyond the concept of “transition” and the struggle over power, which will never move our country forward, but rather take us back to the vicious circle and may lead to a more horrific and destructive war. Alternatively, the meeting could have ended up with only a brief press statement reflecting the consultations that took place to be considered as a first step in the path towards bringing together all the parties to form the national body for constitutional issues, instead of signing a political declaration, thus inaugurating a new “political incubator” that entirely defeats the idea of founding the state through wider political and societal participation! As I conveyed to you, many individuals and groups had pinned their hopes on your leadership of “Tagadum” thinking you would utilize your “symbolic capital”, derived from being the Prime Minister of the post-December revolution government, in order to serve the mega-task of gathering political opponents and expanding participation in a foundational political process, instead of allowing that capital to be exploited by certain political forces to serve their interests in seeking power by going back to the pre-April War era.

Dear Hamdok,

It is clear that the political declaration between “Tagadum” and the RSF’s commander only increases the intensity of political and military polarization, and pushes the political and societal adversaries of “Tagadum” to seek, in turn, an alliance with the armed forces, thus consolidating SAF’s existence as a political party. The preferred step would have required you to proceed with your call for a meeting between Al-Burhan and Hemedti in their capacity as leaders of both sides of the war to reach decisions on ending it, and not to sign a political agreement prepared in advance between only two groups of the old partnership while calling (paragraph iii. 4) the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to sign the Addis Ababa Declaration without his having participated in the process leading up to it, nor in its drafting, unlike what was the case with the negotiations on the political agreement and the Transitional Constitutional Document in 2019, or even the Framework Agreement on December 5, 2022, which included the three parties together. What difference will the Addis Ababa Declaration make that would ensure its success in ending the war?

Conclusion

I had sent you an open letter entitled (To the Prime Minister: The Password to Success!), in August 2019, before the formation of your first cabinet, stating that the password to guarantee your success in leading the transitional period depends on the extent of your ability to build the largest measure of political and societal consensus/agreement/satisfaction. In fact, it did not take long until the rifts escalated and divisions continued in the political “base/incubator” of the transitional government, which prompted you to launch the “National Crisis and Transition Issues Initiative: The Way Forward,” with the aim of consolidating the principle of open, clear, and transparent dialogue, and its management among the components of the Sudanese people in order to achieve the highest levels of consensus between these components on the issues and challenges facing the democratic civil transition. Even though the initiative did not reach its logical conclusions, yet, your efforts to achieve this consensus did not stop as you also called for (the Crisis group initiative on October 18, 2021) until the October 25 coup took place, which also did not derail you from your attempts to unite the political forces until you submitted your resignation in early January 2022.

With the outbreak of the April War, our reality has become more complex than it was before your resignation from the premiership of the government, all of which must dictate the importance of putting forward a coherent political discourse to the political, societal, and popular forces in which a clear vision and an action plan are presented for implementation, to realize the largest measure of political consensus, and engaging in an all-inclusive foundational political process, which is a necessary exercise before the constitutional conference required to lay the foundation for the Sudanese citizenship state.

In this context, the Addis Ababa Declaration needs a serious and objective review for the Sudanese people to achieve an end to the war and accomplish sustainable peace. Otherwise, the results and repercussions of the declaration will be dire for the country and its people, as the first question asked by observers of the signing scene of the declaration was: What is new that necessitated the establishment of (Tagadum)? We are watching the same entities and the same faces that ran the transitional period in its final version which led to the crisis. This is, in addition to the lack of the requisite sensitivity on the part of “Tagadum” leadership, when meeting the RSF delegation regarding the atrocities which befell the majority of Sudanese as a result of the war, including killing, displacement, , taking refuge, and insults to their dignity.